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The French Revolution: 
A Matter of Circumstances? 
 
Charles Walton 
University of Warwick 
 
 
We live in an age of circumstances – historiographically, that is. Over the 
past few decades, the place of metanarrative and grand theory in history writing 
has given way to “contingency” and the “accidental.” The notion of history as 
unfolding according to some underlying logic has ceded to the notion of history 
as disjointed – as full of unforeseen twists and unintended turns. In following 
history’s crooked line, some scholars of late have ventured into the realm of the 
emotions – those complex areas of consciousness that often defy rational 
intentions. When treated together, circumstances and the emotions often steer 
historians toward an existentialist reading of the past: individuals act but with 
little control over the conditions or the mental processes that propel them 
toward particular choices.  
This essay examines the place of circumstances and contingency in 
French Revolutionary historiography. I show that, time and again, historians 
have invoked these concepts to free history from the “shackles” of metanarrative 
and theory. But retreats into “circumstances” and “contingency” do not last long. 
Metanarrative and theoretical frameworks inevitably return. In recent times, this 
return has come in the form of emotions history. This essay considers the 
implications of this dual emphasis on contingency and the emotions for historical 
agency. I argue that history, when told as the story of unforeseen circumstances, 
unintended consequences and unwilled emotions, can deepen our understanding 
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of how contemporaries experienced their lives, but it also raises methodological 
questions about ethical agency and its connection to historical consequences.  
 
Notions of “contingency” and “circumstances” have surged in recent 
historical scholarship over the past few decades. In an article appearing in The 
American Historical Review (AHR) in 2013, Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord 
Smail quantified the rising frequency of the terms “contingent” and 
“contingency” in the pages of this same academic journal since the 1970s (Graph 
1).1 Use of the concept exploded at the turn of the century. Whereas historians 
invoked the term roughly thirty times between 1995 and 1995, ten years later 
(between 2005 and 2009) they invoked it over three hundred times.  
 
Graph 1. Number of articles and books in the AHR in which the term “contingen*” 
appears at least once, between 1975 and 2009.  
 
 
The authors generally welcome this trend. Contingency, they believe, “is an idea 
of great usefulness” since it challenges deterministic metanarratives. They note, 
however, that, when taken to extremes, contingency hinders efforts to tell any 
coherent story about long stretches of time. “High contingency,” they argue, leads 
to analytical cul-de-sacs. More importantly, they insist that contingency, despite 
its pervasiveness in the discipline today, has failed to debunk metanarratives 
about modernity. History may follow crooked lines over short stretches, but 
                                                        
1 Shryock and Smail, “History and the pre-”, Figure 4, 719. 
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when longer periods are considered, a border inevitably emerges, explicitly or 
implicitly, between the modern and the pre-modern. 
Use of the term “circumstances” also increased in the late twentieth 
century. Based on my analysis of the AHR, the term appeared with growing 
frequency between the 1960s and 2000, with a dramatic spike in the 1990s, just 
as “contingency” began to take off (Graph 2). 
 
Graph 2. Number of articles using the term “circumstances” at least once in the 
AHR (1890–2019) 
 
Although the term’s frequency has fallen since 2000, this decline may reflect a 
growing preference for the more technical term of “contingency” and its 
cognates. In any case, the frequency of the qualified formulation “unforeseen 
circumstances” between the 1890s and the present shows a rise in use in recent 
decades. Of the fifty-five occurrences of the catchphrase in the AHR since the 
journal’s founding, more than half (twenty-nine) have appeared since 1990. 
 This growing emphasis on contingency and circumstances is reflected in 
recent French Revolutionary historiography, especially in explanations of the 
Terror. To take just a few examples from the past decade or so: Peter McPhee: 
“The year of ‘terror until peace’ is best explained by an explosion of 
circumstances and convictions.” Timothy Tackett: “Circumstances had a 
powerful impact on the coming of the Terror [along with emotions].” Marisa 
Linton: “... the path that led to terror [... involved] contingent events and 
individual choices in the context of shifting circumstances.” I have woven 
circumstances into my own historical arguments as well: “Indeed, I believe that 
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circumstances go further than ideas in explaining the different courses that free 
speech took in the early French and American republics.”2 
Of course, contingency and circumstances are not new concepts. They 
have been at the center of debates over historical methods since the profession’s 
early days. In his 1910 article “The Circumstance of the Substance of History,” 
Frederick Teggart, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, urged 
historians to think more like social scientists and explain change rather than 
limiting themselves to describing changing circumstances.  
 Teggart acknowledged the importance of reconstructing circumstances, 
and he respected the critical approach to archival research developed by 
Leopold von Ranke in the first half of the nineteenth century. But describing 
circumstances was not enough. He called for grasping the “substance” of history, 
by which he meant processes of change, and he pointed to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution as an epistemological model. Darwin did not simply describe his 
empirical evidence. He reflected on it, drew connections and induced underlying 
processes. Teggart criticized his fellow historians for being too much “Ranke” 
and not enough “Darwin,” “confining themselves solely to the exposition of 
positive facts without attempting to draw from them inductions.”3  
Teggart’s distinction between empirical facts and processes of change – 
between the “circumstances” and the “substance” of history – was unfair to 
Ranke. As Georg Iggers has shown, it was early twentieth-century American 
historians, such as Teggart, who turned Ranke into a shallow, fact-grubbing 
                                                        
2 McPhee, Liberty or Death, 272; Tackett, The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution, 348; 
Linton, Choosing Terror, 270; Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution, 235. 
3 Teggart, “The Circumstance or the Substance of History”, esp. 709–10. 
 5 
positivist.4 They mistranslated Ranke’s motto “Wie es eigentlich gewesen” as 
“history as it really was” instead of “history as it essentially was.” Essence, for 
Ranke, was the spirit of the age, which contained within it the elements of 
historical change. Ranke believed that history unfolded through organic 
processes in the relations among individuals, nations and states. Facts needed to 
be gathered and assessed, to be sure, but the historian also had to intuit their 
interconnectedness. And although he rejected Hegel’s belief that history was 
propelled by a dialectical tension between the “rational” and the “real,” he 
nevertheless saw history as driven by a tension between universal religions and 
the particularities of nations.5 Providence, for Ranke, was the ultimate engine of 
historical change. And although he doubted that historians could ever fully grasp 
it, he believed they could get nearer to it by patiently reconstructing the past 
through archives and tracing the processes of change inherent in them.  
In practice, of course, historians generally combine the two approaches: 
they reconstruct contexts through evidence and description, and they explain 
change using theory and conceptual frameworks. Mid twentieth-century Marxist 
historians of the French Revolution adopted both approaches but applied them 
to different levels of analysis. To understand the medium durée structuring the 
Revolution’s plate tectonics, they embraced the theory of class struggle and the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism. To understand the Terror (1793–94), 
however, they pointed to circumstances. In his overview of the French 
                                                        
4 Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, , xi–xlv. 
5 Woolf, A Concise History of History, 177. 
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Revolution, Albert Soboul concluded that the political violence of the Year II was 
to “be explained by the special circumstances of the moment.”6  
Early revisionist historians also espoused the thesis of circumstances but 
put even more stress on it. They criticized the Marxists, not for their reliance on 
circumstances to explain the Terror but for their reliance on the “deterministic” 
theory of class struggle. In “The Myth of the French Revolution” (1955), Alfred 
Cobban quoted Alexis de Tocqueville to express his disdain for theory. “[How] I 
hate those absolute systems which derive all the events in history from great 
first causes, link one to another in a chain of destiny, and, so to speak, eliminate 
men from history.”7 Much like E. P. Thompson two decades later (though with 
very different politics), Cobban believed that theory diminished human agency.8  
In a later essay, “Historians and the Causes of the French Revolution” 
(1958), Cobban criticized Marxist theories of history of being too formulaic. “The 
problem of the causes [of the French Revolution] is no longer to find an equation, 
a + b ± c = d, but to analyze, as well as one can, the elements in an enormously 
complex and changing historic situation [i.e., circumstances], and to trace the 
process by which it was translated into another situation.”9 The advice sounds 
commonsensical, but it skirts the very problem Cobban sought to explain: 
causation. What, precisely, is the nature of this “process” by which one set of 
circumstances is “translated” into another? Is it organic and therefore specific to 
the historical context itself? Perhaps, although Cobban appears to treat 
circumstances (“historic situations”) as one thing and “processes” of 
                                                        
6 Soboul, The French Revolution, 1787–1799 , 386. 
7 Cobban, Aspects of the French Revolution, 94. 
8 Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays.  
9 Cobban, Aspects of the French Revolution, 65–66. 
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“translation” as another, much as Teggart had. It is not clear that Cobban saw 
circumstances as the sole and unique drivers of historical change. 
That shift came with the young François Furet and Denis Richet’s La 
Révolution française (1965). They put circumstances and contingency at the 
heart of their analysis. Instead of positing “set of circumstances A,” injecting 
them into some “process,” and deriving “set of circumstances B,” Furet and 
Richet saw change inhering in historical circumstances themselves. They 
adopted this view to combat the historical determinisms of the political right 
(which attributed the Revolution to the Enlightenment) and political left (which 
attributed it to class struggle). “Were the events of 10 August 1792,” when the 
monarchy fell, “the culmination of some inevitable historical process?”10 No, they 
concluded. “To escape from the snares of this kind of determinist history, let us 
put the problem in very different terms and ask ourselves this question: [...] what 
exactly were the historical ‘accidents’ that led to the failure of the liberal 
revolution of the eighteenth century?”11  
But attributing change to accidents was not very satisfying in the end. 
After all, where does one go after describing history as a series of train wrecks? 
Even Furet got bored with the approach. Less than a decade later, he offered a 
devastating critique of the theory of circumstances and turned to ideology to 
explain change. Oddly, he did not scrutinize his and Richet’s thesis of 
circumstances. Instead, he criticized Marxist historians for relying on 
circumstances to explain – or explain away – the Terror. His Pensée la Révolution 
of 1978 is contradictory on this point. In some passages, he accuses Marxists of 
                                                        
10 Furet and Richet, The French Revolution, 122. 
11 Ibid., 123. 
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straightjacketing their evidence to make it fit their script, beginning with effects 
(social and political transformation) then deriving causes (class struggle, 
changes in the modes of production).12 But in others, he criticizes them for 
arguing that the circumstances of war led to the Terror. What they failed to see, 
he insisted, was how the war was itself the effect of ideology, specifically, 
Rousseauian ideas of virtue and the social contract. “The truth is,” he wrote, “the 
Terror was an integral part of revolutionary ideology, which, just as it shaped 
action and political endeavor during that period, gave its own meaning to 
‘circumstances’ that were largely of its own making.”13 “There were no 
revolutionary circumstances,” he concluded, “there was a Revolution that fed on 
circumstances.”14  
According to Furet, then, Marxist historians of the French Revolution 
could do no right. Their theory of class conflict was too deterministic, but their 
reliance on circumstances to explain the Terror overlooked how circumstances 
were determined by ideology.  
 
Something of a parting of the ways in French Revolutionary 
historiography occurred with the rise of cultural history in the 1980s. While 
some historians took a sociocultural path, others took the linguistic turn. The 
sociocultural historians continued to focus on socioeconomic life and 
circumstances while dropping Marxist teleology and rigid class categories. (That 
said, the bourgeoisie and the transition from feudalism to capitalism have made 
                                                        
12 Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, especially the essay “The Revolutionary catechism,” 
81–131. 
13 Ibid., 62. 
14 Ibid. 
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something of a comeback in recent years.15) Many took up the study of 
“experience” – an analytical concept pioneered by E. P. Thompson. Experience 
has been central to much of Peter McPhee’s work, especially Living the French 
Revolution, 1789–99, Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life and his recent Liberty or 
Death: The French Revolution.16 These studies show how individuals, from rural 
peasants to legislators in Paris, experienced events and how their experiences 
shaped their convictions and actions. In general, the logic of “experience” history 
runs something like this: traditions and contingency mix to produce experience, 
which, in turn, generates consciousness and agency.  
While sociocultural historians were reconstructing lived experience, 
discourse historians, especially in the United States, were reconstructing the 
conceptual frames through which experience was understood and expressed. 
Analysis focused on language, representation, and symbols.17 In her Politics, 
Culture and Class in the French Revolution (1985) and The Family Romance and 
the French Revolution (1992), Lynn Hunt drew on cultural and psychological 
theories – Clifford Geertz’s “cultural frames”, Sigmund Freud’s “oedipal complex” 
and René Girard’s “sacrificial crisis” – to interpret the French Revolution.18 Keith 
M. Baker drew on Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis, filtering it through the 
methods developed by Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School. He attributed 
the Revolution’s radical course to the inherent logic of political discourse, 
                                                        
15 Sewell, “Connecting Capitalism to the French Revolution;” Clay, “The Bourgeoisie, Capitalism, 
and the Origins of the French Revolution.” For works engaging with Marx’s “means of exchange” 
(or those of Marxist philosophers) and of the morality surrounding them, see Spang, Stuff and 
Money in the Time of the French Revolution and Walton, “Capitalism’s Alter-Ego: The Birth of 
‘Reciprocity’ in Eighteenth-century France.” For the shift from feudal to modern forms of 
property, see Blaufarb, The Great Demarcation.  
16 McPhee, Living the French Revolution; Robespierre; and Liberty or Death. 
17 For a critique of social experience and defense of linguistic conceptual frameworks, see Scott, 
“The Evidence of Experience.” 
18 Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution; The Family Romance and the French 
Revolution.  
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specifically, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas about political will and moral 
regeneration.19 In “discourse” histories, circumstances tended to be ornamental, 
embellishing accounts of historical change that were ultimately propelled by 
ideological and semiotic forces.  
The linguistic turn was short-lived. By the mid-1990s, even Lynn Hunt 
was calling for historians to adopt “practical realism” and a return to “facts.”20 
And although Baker remained committed to discourse analysis, he treated 
discourses less as determinants (he distanced himself from his earlier claim that 
revolutionaries, in adopting Rousseau’s language of political will in 1789, “opted 
for the Terror”) than as “conditions of possibility.”21 Historians abandoned the 
search for “causes,” which now seemed naively deterministic, in order to identify 
“origins,” which were more open-ended. Space opened up for contingency, 
circumstances and creative agency. Nothing had to happen the way it did. 
Contingency and choice inflected the course of history at each fork in the road. 
The renewed stress on “contingency” and “circumstances” in the mid-
1990s – a phenomenon reflected in The American Historical Review, as we have 
seen – had an impact on notions of historical change. There was something of a 
return to Ranke’s organicism – the idea that the forces of change were intrinsic 
to the specificities of the historical situation. Timothy Tackett foregrounded 
circumstances to explain the origins of the Terror in Becoming a Revolutionary: 
The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a 
Revolutionary Culture (1789–1790).22 Most of his study traces the process of 
polarization in the National Assembly during the first year of the Revolution. It 
                                                        
19 Baker, Inventing the French Revolution.  
20 Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth about History. 
21 Baker, “A Foucauldian French Revolution?,” 187–205. 
22 Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, 312-313.  
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was less ideology than the experience of tumultuous change that turned the 
deputies into revolutionaries. But rather than link this experience and 
polarization to the Revolution’s slide into the Terror of 1793–94, Tackett argues 
that, to the contrary, there was nothing in this polarization process that made the 
Terror inevitable. It was subsequent contingent events – and especially the failed 
flight of the king from France in 1791, the topic of his next book, When the King 
Took Flight – that sent an otherwise viable constitutional monarchy to its 
doom.23 
But just as Furet had turned to “ideology” to broaden his and Richet’s 
prior focus on contingency, Tackett broadened his “circumstances” thesis by 
analyzing emotions in his The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution 
(2015).24 Tackett was not alone in taking this “emotions” turn. Many historians 
in our historiographical “age of circumstances” have sought to combine 
contingency and the emotions in their analyses. In doing so, however, they have 
altered notions of historical agency, which had been central and influential in the 
works of E. P. Thompson. For Thompson, historical conditions and circumstances 
shaped agency but did not determine it. His The Making of the English Working 
Class (1963) drew inspiration from Marx’s insight in The Eighteenth of Brumaire 
about history’s creativity and constraints: “Men make their own history, but they 
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given 
and transmitted from the past.”25 A libertarian communist, Thompson stressed 
the initiative and inventiveness of historical agents. He opposed the “hard” 
                                                        
23 Tackett, When the King Took Flight. 
24 Tackett, The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution.  
25 Marx, The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 7. 
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Marxism of Stalinist scholars of the 1950s, who considered the involuntary 
drivers of human action. Like Cobban and de Tocqueville (though, again, with 
radically different politics), he sought to restore free will to historical actors. He 
depicted them as beating a path through a thicket of constraints to forge their 
own identities, solidarities and consciousness. His protagonists were in 
command of their intellectual, moral and emotional capacities: “Such men,” he 
writes of his early nineteenth-century working-class heroes, “met Utilitarianism 
in their daily lives, and they sought to throw it back, not blindly, but with 
intelligence and moral passion.”26 They may have lost the historical battle, but 
they were not history’s fools.  
Recent work on the French Revolution focusing on circumstances and the 
emotions alters this Thompsonian balance between free will and non-volitional 
forces, tilting it towards the latter. Instead of setting parameters for agency, 
circumstances and emotions together short-circuit it, producing mental conflicts 
that lead people to act in ways they never intended. Circumstances and the 
emotions get the better of French revolutionaries, derailing them from their 
high-minded principles and projects. They still have agency but of an existential 
sort: they must choose to act but under conditions that deprive them of any 
meaningful control over their circumstances, historical consequences and even 
their consciousness. 
This existentialist understanding of agency shows through in much recent 
work on the French Revolution and the Terror, including my own. I cite (and 
implicitly sympathize with) early revolutionary legislators who recognized that 
revolutionary circumstances were not ideal for implementing their cherished 
                                                        
26 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 832. 
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principle of freedom of expression.27 Passions ran too high, and notions of honor 
were too strong for revolutionary leaders to be able to shrug off the torrent of 
insults and calumny that freedom of expression had unleashed. Injurious speech 
triggered anger and punitive impulses, which propelled the Terror, when nearly 
a third of the “suspects” arrested were charged with speech crimes. In some 
cases, insulted leaders found themselves pressured to seek vengeance even 
when they did not want to, since their individual honor had become inseparable 
from that of their constituents, supporters and “the nation.” The absence of libel 
law and breakdown of civil justice – both contingencies – compounded the 
problem. In my reading, revolutionaries did not intentionally “will” this mess. 
They found themselves caught up in a maelstrom of unforeseen circumstances 
and emotional dynamics that they could not control – so I argued. 
In Choosing Terror, Marisa Linton shows revolutionaries making choices 
under similar conditions. Those choices were determined largely by their 
educations (which taught them to love virtue), circumstances (war) and 
emotions (fear). The combination of these factors drove ordinary individuals to 
act in ways they never intended. Linton’s revolutionaries have agency – they 
choose. But they do not appear to have much free will. She concludes a chapter 
on Robespierre with a quote from the contemporary René Levasseur, with whom 
she seems to agree: “The Terror was a collective response to a desperate 
situation, born out ‘of circumstances and not the will of men’.”28 If this is true – 
and Linton makes a persuasive case that it was – does agency in the 
Thompsonian sense still have any relevancy? Was terror really a choice or did 
                                                        
27 Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution, 135–36. 
28 Linton, Choosing Terror, 270. 
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contingent circumstances and emotional dynamics make it all but a foregone 
conclusion? If it was a choice, what were the plausible alternatives? 
To point out the implications of the thesis of circumstances and the 
emotions for historical agency is not to deny the considerable impact of these 
factors. The works of Peter McPhee, Marisa Linton, Timothy Tackett, William 
Reddy, Sophie Wahnich, and Lynn Hunt, among others, which pursue this line of 
interpretation, have given us a deeper understanding of revolutionary 
subjectivity.29 And the approach makes a great deal of intuitive sense. It is clear 
that individuals do not entirely control their circumstances and that their 
emotions can compel them to behave in unintended ways. What I wish to draw 
attention to is what this means for our understanding of historical agency. How 
much of a disconnect do we want to posit between intentions and outcomes? Is 
history, told as the story of unintended consequences, useful for thinking about 
our own historical agency today?  
It is not surprising that invocations of “unintended consequences” have 
risen alongside “contingency” and “unforeseen circumstances” over the past two 
decades. The three notions share the premise that there is indeed a disconnect 
between what is in people’s minds and how history unfolds. Developed in the 
early to mid-twentieth century by the sociologist Robert Merton and frequently 
employed by economists since then, the catchphrase “unintended consequences” 
has come to pervade the discipline of history in recent decades.30 Its frequency in 
The American Historical Review doubled between the 1980s and the 2000s and 
                                                        
29 The relevant works of Linton, McPhee and Tackett have been cited above. See 
also Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling; Wahnich, In Defense of the Terror; and 
Hunt, Inventing Human Rights. 
30 Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action.” For a recent synthesis 
of how economists use the concept, see Aydinonat, The Invisible Hand: How Economists Explain 
Unintended Social Consequences. 
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has doubled again between the 2000s and today (Graph 3). If we are living in an 
age of “circumstances” and “contingency”, we are also living in the age of 
“unintended consequences”: we tend to portray agents as the unwitting 
architects of their own dilemmas and failures. 
 
Graph 3: Use of the term “unintended consequences” in the AHR (1940–2019) 
  
 
 
Like “contingency” and “unforeseen circumstances”, the thesis of “unintended 
consequences” is defensible in small doses. Taken too far, it poses problems, not 
least for how we understand our own historical agency. If intentions have little 
relation to consequences once they pass through the blender of circumstances 
and the emotions, on what basis should we choose to act today? The thesis of 
“unintended consequences” runs the risk of reducing history to a series of 
accidental “one-offs” – “one damned thing after another”, as historian Arnold 
Toynbee derisively put it – or of situating causation so far beyond the realm of 
intentions that humans are depleted of ethical agency. They are buffeted by 
forces they cannot comprehend, much less control, including (once emotions are 
triggered) their own consciousness.  
As dark clouds form on our own historical horizons – constitutional 
crises, rising authoritarianism, online disinformation and manipulation of 
emotions, looming environmental catastrophe – we will be compelled, by the 
force of circumstances, to act. We will have to make choices. But if history 
becomes the story of unforeseen circumstances, unintended consequences and 
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unwilled emotions, can it provide us with any lessons? “Purists,” such as Ranke, 
would insist that providing lessons is not within the historian’s remit.31 If that is 
the case, then we might as well limit ourselves to an ethics of conviction. That is, 
we might as well act according to our beliefs and let the consequences be 
damned since we cannot control them anyway. It seems to me, however, that 
history is better suited to an ethics of responsibility. This requires, as Max Weber 
explained, “giving an account of the foreseeable results of one’s actions.” 32 It 
involves thinking through potential consequences and calibrating the pursuit of 
ideals to the circumstances. Recent histories of the French Revolution that stress 
circumstances and the emotions can be useful in this regard: they help us see 
how emotions, under certain conditions, can lead to actions that go against 
stated convictions. But if historians focus only on the choices actors made and 
not the ones they could have made but did not, there is a risk of lapsing into 
determinism. Moreover, once circumstances are seen to generate emotions that 
propel individuals to behave in ways that undermine or contradict their beliefs, 
it becomes difficult to discern any link between beliefs, will, and consequences.  
How, then, might we avoid depicting past actors as history’s prisoners 
and dupes? One way might be to engage in counterfactual reflection – to consider 
the plausible choices those actors could have made even in light of their 
circumstances and emotions. After all, if a contingency-based explanation points 
to only one outcome (what happened), it is perforce deterministic. 
Counterfactuals give contingency room to breathe, opening up space for agency 
and choice. Historians generally dismiss counterfactuals as amateurish 
                                                        
31 Ranke, The Secret of World History, 58. 
32 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 120. 
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speculation. They shouldn’t. Strong arguments have been made by philosophers 
of history that counterfactuals hover in the background of all historical analysis. 
Martin Bunzl observes that when historians “make causal claims,” elevating one 
set of factors over others to explain events, “then counterfactual claims come 
along for the ride, like it or not.”33 So why not come clean and address them head 
on? Nor do counterfactuals require flights into fancy. Good counterfactual 
reasoning hews closely to context, or “conditions of possibility.” It imagines what 
might have happened if one conditioned possibility (plausible by definition) had 
been chosen over another. Counterfactuals require expertise – a deep 
understanding of the causal forces that produce circumstances and an ability to 
discern their relative preponderance and interconnections. They sharpen causal 
reasoning by encouraging the historian to assess where historical factors lie on 
the spectrum between influence and constraint. Most importantly, 
counterfactuals reinforce the ethical agency we ascribe to historical actors. 
Those actors may have been conditioned or constrained by various forces, 
including their emotions, but they did have choices, and choosing y instead of x 
might have produced a different outcome.  
Of course, the primary task of historians is to explain what did happen. 
But reflecting on the paths not taken can make history useful to “think with” as 
we navigate our own “complex and changing historic situation” (Cobban). Such 
an approach can help turn past “unforeseens” into future “foreseeables,” or at 
least “likely possibilities” since circumstances never fully repeat themselves. 
Approaching history from this angle would enhance our own sense of historical 
                                                        
33 Bunzl, “Counterfactual History,”  846. 
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agency, reminding us that there is at least some connection between what we 
will and the world we create. 
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